A lottery Blotto game with heterogeneous items of asymmetric valuations

Geofferey Jiyun Kim, Jerim Kim, Bara Kim

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

We develop a multi-player lottery Blotto game in which each contested item can be valuated differently by involved agents and in which each contested item can be differently valuated from other contested items. We prove that the Blotto game with a finite number of agents has a Nash equilibrium. We characterize all Nash equilibria for the case of two agents.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-5
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Volume173
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2018

Keywords

  • Asymmetric valuations
  • Heterogeneous items
  • Lagrange multiplier
  • Lottery Blotto game
  • Nash equilibria

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