A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

Sungwhee Shin; Sang Chul Suh

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1

A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

Sungwhee Shin, Sang Chul Suh

School of Economics

University of Windsor

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

23 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a stable mechanism where each agent announces his/her own preferences and a stable matching is selected for the announced preference profile. We show that the mechanism implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong equilibrium. In other words, when we select any stable matching to an announced preference profile, in fact the matching is stable for the true preference profile in environments where agents' behaviors are described by a strong Nash equilibrium.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	185-189
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	51
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1
State	Published - May 1996

Keywords

Matching
Stable rule
Strong Nash equilibrium

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10.1016/0165-1765(96)00805-1

Cite this

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AB - We consider a stable mechanism where each agent announces his/her own preferences and a stable matching is selected for the announced preference profile. We show that the mechanism implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong equilibrium. In other words, when we select any stable matching to an announced preference profile, in fact the matching is stable for the true preference profile in environments where agents' behaviors are described by a strong Nash equilibrium.

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KW - Stable rule

KW - Strong Nash equilibrium

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A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

Abstract

Keywords

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