A mechanism implementing the stable rule in marriage problems

Sungwhee Shin, Sang Chul Suh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

23 Scopus citations


We consider a stable mechanism where each agent announces his/her own preferences and a stable matching is selected for the announced preference profile. We show that the mechanism implements the stable rule that selects all of the stable matchings in a strong equilibrium. In other words, when we select any stable matching to an announced preference profile, in fact the matching is stable for the true preference profile in environments where agents' behaviors are described by a strong Nash equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)185-189
Number of pages5
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 1996


  • Matching
  • Stable rule
  • Strong Nash equilibrium


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