Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition

Myeonghwan Cho, Joon Song

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study auctions for business licenses, where only the winners can participate in Cournot competition. This is an example of a multi-unit auction with endogenous and interdependent values. We compare a pay-as-bid auction and a uniform price auction. Assuming that only the winners’ identity and their payments are announced after the auction, the former auction is advantageous in terms of auction revenue, and the latter is advantageous in terms of consumer surplus.

Original languageEnglish
Article number110176
JournalEconomics Letters
StatePublished - Jan 2022


  • License auction
  • Multi-unit auction
  • Post-auction competition


Dive into the research topics of 'Auctioning business licenses to engage in Cournot competition'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this