Do Financial Analysts Herd?

Financial analysts may have strategic incentives to herd or to anti-herd when issuing forecasts of firms' earnings. This paper develops and implements a new test to examine whether such incentives exist and to identify the form of strategic behaviour. We use the equilibrium property of the finite-player forecasting game of Kim and Shim [2019. “Forecast Dispersion in Finite-Player Forecasting Games.” The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 19 (1).] that forecast dispersion decreases (resp. increases) as the number of forecasters increases if and only if there is strategic complementarity (resp. substitutability) in their forecasts. Using the I/B/E/S database, we find strong evidence that supports strategic herding incentive of financial analysts through a plausible natural experiment setting of brokerage house mergers. We show further that this finding is robust to different forecast horizons and is more pronounced for firms with low initial coverage.