Fault injection attack on A5/3

Kitae Jeong, Yuseop Lee, Jaechul Sung, Seokhie Hong

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a fault injection attack on A5/3 used in GSM. This attack is based on the fault assumption in [9]. That is, it is assumed that we can decrease the number of rounds in block cipher KASUMI of A5/3 by injecting some faults. With small number of fault injections, we can recover the session key of A5/3 supporting a 64-bit session key. This is the first known cryptanalytic result on A5/3 so far.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011
Pages300-303
Number of pages4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2011
Event9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011 - Busan, Korea, Republic of
Duration: 26 May 201128 May 2011

Publication series

NameProceedings - 9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011

Conference

Conference9th IEEE International Symposium on Parallel and Distributed Processing with Applications, ISPA 2011
Country/TerritoryKorea, Republic of
CityBusan
Period26/05/1128/05/11

Keywords

  • A5/3
  • Cryptanalysis
  • Fault injection attack
  • GSM

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