Flexibility mechanisms and credit discounting

Sungwhee Shin, Sang Chul Suh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations


We consider the international treaties on climate change as self-enforcing agreements. Applying non-cooperative game theory, we interpret the UN framework Convention on Climate Change as a Nash equilibrium outcome of an international abatement game where only domestic abatement is allowed. The Kyoto Protocol is a Nash equilibrium outcome of the game where flexibility mechanisms are introduced. We also show that credit discounting on foreign abatement can Pareto improve the welfare of all countries.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)247-260
Number of pages14
JournalEnvironment and Development Economics
Issue number2
StatePublished - May 2003


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