Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria

Eun Jeong Heo, Vikram Manjunath

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


We study solutions that choose lotteries for profiles of preferences defined over sure alternatives. We define Nash equilibria based on “stochastic dominance” comparisons and study the implementability of solutions in such equilibria. We show that a Maskin-style invariance condition is necessary and sufficient for implementability. Our results apply to an abstract Arrovian environment as well as a broad class of economic environments.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)5-30
Number of pages26
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number1
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2017


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