Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria

Eun Jeong Heo; Vikram Manjunath

doi:10.1007/s00355-015-0915-2

Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria

Eun Jeong Heo, Vikram Manjunath

School of Economics

Texas A&M University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study solutions that choose lotteries for profiles of preferences defined over sure alternatives. We define Nash equilibria based on “stochastic dominance” comparisons and study the implementability of solutions in such equilibria. We show that a Maskin-style invariance condition is necessary and sufficient for implementability. Our results apply to an abstract Arrovian environment as well as a broad class of economic environments.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	5-30
Number of pages	26
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	48
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-015-0915-2
State	Published - 1 Jan 2017

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Implementation in stochastic dominance Nash equilibria

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