Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

Eun Jeong Heo; Sunghoon Hong; Youngsub Chun

doi:10.1007/s00199-020-01276-y

Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

Eun Jeong Heo, Sunghoon Hong, Youngsub Chun

Seoul National University

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Recent developments in immunosuppressive protocols have enabled patients to receive kidney transplants from biologically incompatible donors. We propose to use immunosuppressants as a part of kidney exchange program. We introduce the “pairwise cycles and chains (PCC)” solution and show that it is Pareto efficient, monotonic, and maximizes the number of compatible transplants and the total number of transplants at the same time among all monotonic matchings.

Original language	English
Journal	Economic Theory
Volume	72
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01276-y
State	Published - Jul 2021

Keywords

Immunosuppressants
Kidney exchange
Maximality
Monotonicity
Pairwise cycles and chains solution
Pareto efficiency

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10.1007/s00199-020-01276-y

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title = "Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants",

abstract = "Recent developments in immunosuppressive protocols have enabled patients to receive kidney transplants from biologically incompatible donors. We propose to use immunosuppressants as a part of kidney exchange program. We introduce the “pairwise cycles and chains (PCC)” solution and show that it is Pareto efficient, monotonic, and maximizes the number of compatible transplants and the total number of transplants at the same time among all monotonic matchings.",

keywords = "Immunosuppressants, Kidney exchange, Maximality, Monotonicity, Pairwise cycles and chains solution, Pareto efficiency",

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KW - Maximality

KW - Monotonicity

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KW - Pareto efficiency

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Kidney exchange with immunosuppressants

Abstract

Keywords

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