Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem

Sungwhee Shin, Sang Chul Suh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations


In a permit sharing problem, we investigate allocation schemes which are immune to manipulation where the information about technology is private. We show that among efficient solutions, there is no solution which satisfies Individual Rationality and Non-Manipulability via technology.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)103-108
Number of pages6
JournalEconomics Letters
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jul 2007


  • Efficiency
  • Individual Rationality
  • Non-Manipulability
  • Permit sharing


Dive into the research topics of 'Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this