Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem

Sungwhee Shin; Sang Chul Suh

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.017

Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem

Sungwhee Shin, Sang Chul Suh

School of Economics

University of Windsor

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

In a permit sharing problem, we investigate allocation schemes which are immune to manipulation where the information about technology is private. We show that among efficient solutions, there is no solution which satisfies Individual Rationality and Non-Manipulability via technology.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	103-108
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	96
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.017
State	Published - Jul 2007

Keywords

Efficiency
Individual Rationality
Non-Manipulability
Permit sharing

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10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.017

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title = "Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem",

abstract = "In a permit sharing problem, we investigate allocation schemes which are immune to manipulation where the information about technology is private. We show that among efficient solutions, there is no solution which satisfies Individual Rationality and Non-Manipulability via technology.",

keywords = "Efficiency, Individual Rationality, Non-Manipulability, Permit sharing",

author = "Sungwhee Shin and Suh, {Sang Chul}",

year = "2007",

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KW - Individual Rationality

KW - Non-Manipulability

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Non-Manipulability vs. Individual Rationality in a permit sharing problem

Abstract

Keywords

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