Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction

Myeonghwan Cho

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.022

Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction

Myeonghwan Cho

School of Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider a situation in which each agent observes only their neighbor's actions and locally interacts with them by playing prisoner's dilemma games. Introducing a public randomization, we construct an equilibrium which sustains cooperation and in which cooperation eventually resumes after any history.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	280-282
Number of pages	3
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	112
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.022
State	Published - Sep 2011

Keywords

Local interaction
Network
Public randomization
Repeated prisoner's dilemma game

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10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.022

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title = "Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction",

abstract = "We consider a situation in which each agent observes only their neighbor's actions and locally interacts with them by playing prisoner's dilemma games. Introducing a public randomization, we construct an equilibrium which sustains cooperation and in which cooperation eventually resumes after any history.",

keywords = "Local interaction, Network, Public randomization, Repeated prisoner's dilemma game",

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KW - Local interaction

KW - Network

KW - Public randomization

KW - Repeated prisoner's dilemma game

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DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.022

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VL - 112

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

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ER -

Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction

Abstract

Keywords

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