Realism and U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea: The Clinton and Bush administrations in comparative perspective

There is a perception gap between the Bush and Clinton administrations about the true nature of North Korea and how the United States should deal with the regime. Many people believe that such a perception gap necessarily leads to the striking difference in foreign policy regarding North Korea. I argue in this article, however, that the perception gap does not directly result in the differences in foreign policy regarding North Korea and that these two allegedly different approaches are, in fact, similar and do not seek completely different policy goals. Drawing on recent developments in realist literature, I argue that what matters is not the perception gap but the specific situation that each administration faces and the foreign policy flexibility that it gradually proposes. The foreign policy differences between the Clinton and Bush administrations concerning North Korea are not predetermined by any difference in their perspectives, but they vary with the specific international situations and decision-making processes. In this process, the most important thing is how the United States will ease the North Korean security dilemma, as defensive realism explains. The reason for the recent North Korean nuclear crisis is not that the Bush administration is inherently more hawkish than the Clinton administration but that the change in the international situation after the terrorist attacks in 2001 strongly influenced U.S. foreign policy toward North Korea. After the events of September 11, the Bush administration did not begin its comprehensive approach to North Korea, as opposed to its announcement after the policy review in July 2001 that it would do so. To ease the North Korean security dilemma and solve the current nuclear deadlock, I argue that the Bush administration must return to its original comprehensive approach and should begin serious talks with North Korea.