Rethinking the East Asian balance of power: Historical antagonism, internal balancing, and the Korean-Japanese security relationship

IR scholars have contended that feelings of amity and enmity cannot account for longer-term variations in decision making and foreign policy outcomes, many of which have involved not only friction but also cooperation. In this sense, I explain such a history variable in terms of IR theory and focus on the issue of balancing options among East Asian states. I ask why South Korea and Japan did not create a bilateral security alliance after World War II, although each country has one with the United States. I argue that historical antagonism has prevented South Korea from pursuing security cooperation with Japan and that the colonial legacy has also affected Japanese security policy. For this purpose, I focus on the two countries' balancing behaviors in the 1970s, when the United States tried to disengage from East Asia, and I ask why South Korea and Japan chose internal balancing rather than external balancing with the other nation.