Strategy-proof rules for two public goods: Double median rules

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We consider the problem of selecting the locations of two (identical) public goods on an interval. Each agent has preferences over pairs of locations, which are induced from single-peaked rankings over single locations: each agent compares pairs of locations by comparing the location he ranks higher in each pair. We introduce a class of "double median rules" and characterize it by means of continuity, anonymity, strategy-proofness, and users only. To each pair of parameter sets, each set in the pair consisting of (n+1) parameters, is associated a rule in the class. It is the rule that selects, for each preference profile, the medians of the peaks and the parameters belonging to each set in the pair. We identify the subclasses of the double median rules satisfying group strategy-proofness, weak efficiency, and double unanimity (or efficiency), respectively. We also discuss the classes of "multiple median rules" and "non-anonymous double median rules".

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)895-922
Number of pages28
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
StatePublished - Oct 2013


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