TY - CHAP
T1 - The United States’ Diplomacy Toward a Nuclearizing DPRK
T2 - Agreed Framework, Six-Party Talks, and Summits
AU - Hwang, Jihwan
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2025 selection and editorial matter, Lam Peng Er; individual chapters, the contributors.
PY - 2024/1/1
Y1 - 2024/1/1
N2 - The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is unlikely to denuclearize. Despite several pledges by North Korean leaders to denuclearize and US diplomatic efforts to guarantee the regime’s security, North Korea appears unwilling to give up its nuclear development programs or its frequent nuclear and missile tests. Despite numerous past agreements between the United States and the DPRK on the latter’s denuclearization, the DPRK leaders have failed to implement these agreements. It is discovered that US agreements with North Korea follow a similar pattern whereby crises broke out, negotiations were stalled for a considerable period of time, and consensuses were eventually reached only to finally collapse. While crises were catalysts for talks, they fell short in providing the impetus for both sides to implement these agreements. Even though the United States seeks to diplomatically engage with the DPRK, it had mostly focused on intensifying sanctions and deterrence whenever North Korea escalated its military provocations by conducting nuclear and missile tests. By focusing on the United States’ three-decade long diplomacy toward the denuclearization of North Korea and its failed efforts in both the crisis and negotiation phases, this chapter considers the dilemma between the United States’ and North Korea’s stances toward denuclearization and a peace regime and explains why the Biden administration’s calibrated and practical approach toward North Korea will not work.
AB - The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is unlikely to denuclearize. Despite several pledges by North Korean leaders to denuclearize and US diplomatic efforts to guarantee the regime’s security, North Korea appears unwilling to give up its nuclear development programs or its frequent nuclear and missile tests. Despite numerous past agreements between the United States and the DPRK on the latter’s denuclearization, the DPRK leaders have failed to implement these agreements. It is discovered that US agreements with North Korea follow a similar pattern whereby crises broke out, negotiations were stalled for a considerable period of time, and consensuses were eventually reached only to finally collapse. While crises were catalysts for talks, they fell short in providing the impetus for both sides to implement these agreements. Even though the United States seeks to diplomatically engage with the DPRK, it had mostly focused on intensifying sanctions and deterrence whenever North Korea escalated its military provocations by conducting nuclear and missile tests. By focusing on the United States’ three-decade long diplomacy toward the denuclearization of North Korea and its failed efforts in both the crisis and negotiation phases, this chapter considers the dilemma between the United States’ and North Korea’s stances toward denuclearization and a peace regime and explains why the Biden administration’s calibrated and practical approach toward North Korea will not work.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85207550278&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4324/9781003502036-4
DO - 10.4324/9781003502036-4
M3 - Chapter
AN - SCOPUS:85207550278
SN - 9781032819167
SP - 17
EP - 49
BT - Engaging North Korea
PB - Taylor and Francis
ER -