Zero-stealthy attack for sampled-data control systems: The case of faster actuation than sensing

Jihan Kim, Gyunghoon Park, Hyungbo Shim, Yongsoon Eun

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionpeer-review

17 Scopus citations

Abstract

In this paper, we introduce a new vulnerability of cyber-physical systems to malicious attack. It arises when the physical system, that is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system, is controlled by a digital controller, i.e., the output is measured only at discrete sensing times. Since the anomaly detector monitors the output signal, nothing abnormal can be detected through the output if the output looks normal at sensing times. This implies that if an (actuator) attack drives the internal states passing through the kernel of the output matrix at each sensing time, then the attack compromises the system while it remains stealthy. We show that this type of attack is feasible when the control system uses multi-rate sampling, and the sampling rate for input signal is higher than that for output measurements. Simulation results for the X-38 vehicle illustrate this new attack strategy possibly brings disastrous consequences.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages5956-5961
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781509018376
DOIs
StatePublished - 27 Dec 2016
Event55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 - Las Vegas, United States
Duration: 12 Dec 201614 Dec 2016

Publication series

Name2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016

Conference

Conference55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityLas Vegas
Period12/12/1614/12/16

Fingerprint

Dive into the research topics of 'Zero-stealthy attack for sampled-data control systems: The case of faster actuation than sensing'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this